When Fridges Became Ovens: Inside the 2026 Supermarket Refrigeration Attacks Across Europe

In two overnight waves, on 11–12 October and 1–2 November 2026, attackers took remote control of supermarket refrigeration controllers and turned fridges and freezers into heaters, some reaching 50°C. The first wave hit about 700 stores in France. The second spread to at least ten more countries, Romania included. No data was stolen and no ransom was demanded. This article reconstructs where they struck, how the attacks worked, what is still unknown, and how to defend against them.

Ilie Lucian - Founder & CyberSecurity Engineer

11/4/202611 min read

Introduction: a Sunday night nobody noticed

Most cyberattacks on retailers go after money or data: card numbers, loyalty databases, ransom payments. The attack that hit French supermarkets in October 2026 went after something far more physical: the cold chain.

On Sunday night, 11 October, while the stores were closed, someone connected to the systems that manage refrigeration and switched the defrost function on. Defrosting is a normal, routine process. Fridges and freezers heat their coils for a short time to stop ice from building up. This time the cycle did not stop. According to Les Mousquetaires, the owner of Intermarché, units in about 150 of its stores sat at up to 50°C for roughly six hours overnight.

By the time staff opened the doors on Monday morning, meat, dairy and frozen products had spoiled. In some stores, equipment had melted or started to smoke. The Paris prosecutor’s office described it as a large-scale attack on connected refrigerators that caused food losses and fires. The head of Coopérative U, Dominique Schelcher, called it unprecedented.

Wave one: France, 11–12 October

The attack was national in scale but concentrated in France. The first reports put the count at a few hundred stores. Two days later, Finance Minister Roland Lescure told Parliament that about 700 of the country’s roughly 10,000 supermarkets had been affected. The figures reported by each chain differ between sources and changed as the week went on:

  • Intermarché and Netto (Les Mousquetaires): about 150 stores at first, later 300 (AP, Security Affairs)

  • Coopérative U (Super U, U): fewer than 100; the CEO later said 80 of about 2,000 (OCCRP)

  • Carrefour: 80 supermarkets out of about 6,000 stores (Blue News / DPA)

  • Monoprix: about 5% of its 490 stores (KIRO 7 / CNN)

  • E.Leclerc: “several stores”, via a refrigeration supplier (Khaleej Times / AFP)

The damage was large even per store. Journal du Geek reported that a single Leclerc store in Wasselonne had to throw away about €220,000 of fresh and frozen goods. Across the sector, the losses were estimated in the tens of millions of euros. The EU food commissioner, Christophe Hansen, also condemned the attack.

Wave two: Europe and Romania, 1–2 November

Three weeks later it happened again, on the same kind of night. Overnight into Monday 2 November, attackers changed refrigeration settings in supermarkets across Belgium, Sweden, Estonia and other countries. This time the hits were smaller per chain, but far wider geographically. Christophe Hansen called the repeated attacks extremely worrying.

Countries and companies reporting incidents:

  • Belgium and Luxembourg: Delhaize, several dozen stores

  • Belgium: Carrefour (15 stores), Intermarché (10–15), Spar (5), IKEA Mons (1), plus butcher shops

  • Ireland: Musgrave / SuperValu, 13 of 223 stores

  • Netherlands: at least 17 businesses, mostly butchers and small shops (unnamed)

  • Portugal: Intermarché, 7 stores

  • Sweden: Coop (6–7 stores) and ICA (a limited number)

  • Romania: one retail chain (not named), 6 stores

  • Italy: Coop stores run by Radenza Group in Sicily, at least 4

  • Finland: Kesko, a few smaller stores

  • Estonia: Selver, 1 store

Source: compiled by The Hacker News from company statements; Romania from DNSC via Observatorul Prahovean / Libertatea.

In Sweden, an ICA store in Sjöbo said its units had been set to 50°C. In Estonia, the same 50°C setpoint was caught within about ten minutes and nothing was lost. A Belgian butcher in Hove estimated about €15,000 of ruined meat.

The Romanian case. Six stores of the same retail chain saw temperatures climb at around 01:30 on 2 November. Staff only noticed at about 08:00. The incident was reported to the national cybersecurity directorate, DNSC. Its director, Dan Cîmpean, said the controllers were connected through GSM routers with static public IP addresses, directly reachable from the internet, and ran fairly old software. According to Monitorul de Galați, the attack did not spread to the retailer’s other IT systems. The chain and the store locations have not been named.

That detail matters. A 4G router with a fixed IP is the cheapest way for a contractor to reach a store’s controller without touching the store’s own network. It also puts the controller one Shodan search away from anyone. The same pattern showed up elsewhere: in the Netherlands, Danfoss said the hit systems were not on a secure network and still used default passwords.

The target: a fridge with a web server

The hacked devices were not household smart fridges. They were the refrigeration system managers that sit in the back office of a supermarket. A system manager coordinates all the refrigeration controllers in a store: compressors, display cases, cold rooms, defrost schedules, temperature alarms and logging. It offers a web interface where an engineer can view each circuit and change temperature thresholds. Business Today noted that the incident involved commercial equipment, not consumer appliances.

The main vendor named in the attack was Danish manufacturer Danfoss. Danfoss said its AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 systems were among those affected. France’s national cybersecurity agency ANSSI, through its CERT-FR team, later said it knew of numerous compromises involving remote control modules from Danfoss and from the US company Copeland. In a later update it also listed Dixell controllers.

Why are these boxes on the internet at all? Because remote access saves money. A refrigeration technician can fix a fault across dozens of stores without driving to each one. Schelcher himself defended connected refrigeration as essential for round-the-clock monitoring. The problem is not connectivity itself. It is how that connectivity was exposed, and who was responsible for maintaining it. As Schelcher pointed out, the supermarkets were often not direct Danfoss customers. The equipment was installed and maintained by refrigeration contractors.

How the attackers did it

Investigators have not published a full technical account yet, so parts of this are reconstruction. But the reporting from French media, vendors and researchers points to a clear sequence:

  1. Reconnaissance. The attackers reportedly used Shodan, a search engine that indexes internet-connected devices, to find Danfoss management interfaces reachable from the public internet. These interfaces have recognisable signatures, so finding them takes minutes, not weeks.

  2. Access. Security researcher Kevin Tellier of Synacktiv told Le Parisien that the attackers exploited a vulnerability in the central control system that manages the refrigeration units. Most targeted units ran outdated firmware or were end-of-life models that no longer receive security patches.

  3. Manipulation. Once inside, the attackers did not need malware. They used a legitimate feature: the forced defrost. BleepingComputer described how the built-in automatic defrost system was triggered to raise temperatures. Some units were reportedly set as high as 50°C.

  4. Alarm evasion. This is the clever part. According to Le Monde, the attackers stretched the defrost cycle from one hour to eight hours so that temperature alarms would not fire. Early findings also suggest some alarm systems were switched off. A long defrost looks “normal” to the system, so staff only found out in the morning.

  5. Timing. The attack ran overnight from Sunday to Monday, when stores were closed and nobody was watching the cases.

The result was physical damage delivered entirely through a management interface. In industrial security terms, this is a textbook case of abusing the control logic of an operational technology (OT) system rather than breaking the hardware.

The weaknesses were public for over a year

None of this came out of nowhere. In 2025, researchers at Claroty’s Team82 took apart the Danfoss AK-SM 800A system manager and reported three flaws. Danfoss fixed all three before the attacks:

  • CVE-2025-41450 – Authentication bypass: a hidden “code of the day” password generated from the date. Rebuild the algorithm and you can log in without the real admin password.

  • CVE-2025-41451 – Command injection: injection through the SMTP email settings, leading to remote code execution.

  • CVE-2025-41452 – External control of configuration: unauthorised changes to the device’s configuration.

The first one is the most striking. Team82 found that the controller accepts a daily password derived from its current date, and they reconstructed the algorithm. The US agency CISA published an advisory in May 2025. Danfoss released fixes in firmware R4.2 and later R4.3.1. The researchers also demonstrated the attack chain live at DEF CON, and their internet scan found 2,765 exposed controllers.

Two cautions are important here. First, nobody has officially confirmed that these exact CVEs were used. CERT-FR’s alert did not tie the attack to a specific vulnerability. Second, much of the affected equipment was older than the patched model. Danfoss said the AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 are end-of-life and get no security updates at all. And in the Netherlands, default passwords were enough. Sometimes attackers do not need an exploit when the front door is open.

The gap between patch and attack is the real story. As Claroty later showed, working exploits for these known flaws can now be rebuilt with AI tools in under half an hour for a few dollars. Old devices waiting for a patch cycle that never comes are an easy target.

Investigation: who did it, and why?

As of early November 2026, nobody knows. No group has claimed either wave, and no motive has been established. No data was stolen and no ransom note appeared, which rules out the usual criminal business model.

In France, the Paris prosecutor’s cybercrime section opened an investigation and assigned it to the national anti-cybercrime office, OFAC. ANSSI warned that the campaigns against these devices were probably still active. After the second wave, Belgium’s federal prosecutor opened its own criminal case. Belgium’s Centre for Cybersecurity said the attackers might never be identified.

The second wave used the same technique, according to Danfoss and the refrigeration contractors Sabcobel and Kitman. But a shared method does not prove the same people. Once the French story showed how easy it was, copycats were a realistic possibility. A few points stand out for anyone weighing the theories:

  • Timing. Both waves ran on a Sunday night, when stores are closed and response is slowest.

  • Choice of target. Food supply is a sensitive sector. The French government called it an attack on the food supply chain.

  • Precursor. In late August, fridges at about a dozen US military commissaries went into unscheduled defrost cycles, in what looks like a similar incident.

Until investigators publish findings, it is best to treat any claim about state actors or AI-driven attacks as speculation.

How to defend against it

The good news: everything that would have stopped these attacks is basic network hygiene. None of it is exotic.

For store operators and refrigeration contractors

The most practical guidance so far comes from CERT-FR’s alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012, which covers Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC, Copeland xweb and Dixell xweb devices:

  1. Take controllers off the public internet. That includes anything sitting behind a GSM/4G router with a static public IP, as in the Romanian case. Check your insurance contract before cutting the contractor’s data feed.

  2. Audit the configuration, especially defrost schedules, setpoints and alarm thresholds. An eight-hour defrost should never pass silently.

  3. Allow remote access only through a VPN or a protected management network. Firewall rules that whitelist the contractor’s IPs are an emergency measure, not a long-term fix.

  4. Update firmware and harden the device. For Danfoss, that means R4.3.1 or later on the AK-SM 800A, the security level set to Strict, and default passwords changed.

  5. If a device was compromised, restart it or reset it to factory settings and reconfigure it before it goes back into service.

  6. Replace end-of-life units. CERT-FR warns that unpatched legacy devices left online are very likely to be compromised, and a reset alone will not protect them.

On top of that, a few principles from general OT security apply directly:

  • Segment the network. Refrigeration controllers belong in their own VLAN, separate from point-of-sale, CCTV and office IT, with no route from the internet.

  • Monitor independently. Use a temperature sensor and alert path that does not depend on the controller itself. If the attacker owns the controller, they can silence its alarms.

  • Watch for anomalies. A SIEM or simple logging should flag logins at 01:30 on a Sunday, or config changes from unknown IPs.

  • Keep an asset inventory. Sweden’s NCSC advised organisations to list every internet-connected device, decide whether it needs to be online, and protect those that stay connected.

  • Clarify responsibility. Many retailers did not even know which vendor’s controllers they had, because contractors owned the setup. Security requirements belong in the maintenance contract.

For home users with smart appliances

Your kitchen fridge was not part of these attacks. Still, the same logic applies to any connected device at home:

  • Change default passwords and turn on two-factor authentication in the manufacturer’s app.

  • Install firmware updates, and check how long the vendor promises to support the device before you buy it.

  • Put smart-home devices on a guest or IoT Wi-Fi network, separate from your laptop and phone.

  • Disable remote access features you do not use, and never forward router ports to an appliance.

Conclusion: the cold chain is now an attack surface

These attacks did not need malware, a zero-day or an insider. They needed a search engine, controllers that were left reachable from the internet, and firmware nobody had updated. The vulnerabilities were documented, patched and even demonstrated on stage months before the first fridge warmed up.

The lesson reaches well beyond supermarkets. Every building is full of small, forgotten controllers: HVAC, lifts, access control, solar inverters. Each one was installed by a contractor for convenience and then left alone for years. The French and European incidents show what happens when someone finally goes looking for them. Security teams need to find these devices first.

Sources

Official and research

  1. CERT-FR / ANSSI (2026, Oct 12; updated Oct 16). Alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012. https://cert.cyber.gouv.fr/alerte/CERTFR-2026-ALE-012/

  2. CISA (2025, May). ICS Advisory ICSA-25-140-03: Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA Series. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-140-03

  3. Claroty Team82 (2026). Freeze the Controller, Defrost the Food. https://claroty.com/team82/research/freeze-the-controller-defrost-the-food-uncovering-vulnerabilities-in-danfoss-refrigeration-controllers

  4. INCIBE-CERT (2026, Oct 14). Cyberattack on Supermarket Refrigeration Systems in France. https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/publications/cybersecurity-highlights/cyberattack-supermarket-refrigeration-systems-france

  5. NCSC Sweden (2026, Nov). Cyberangrepp mot kylsystem. https://www.ncsc.se/sv/aktuellt/cyberangrepp-mot-kylsystem/

Wave one: France

  1. BleepingComputer (2026, Oct 12). Cyberattack shuts down refrigerators at French supermarkets. https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cyberattack-shuts-down-refrigerators-at-french-supermarkets

  2. The Hacker News (2026, Oct). Attackers heat French supermarket fridges. https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/attackers-heat-french-supermarket.html

  3. Associated Press via ClickOnDetroit (2026, Oct 13). Cyberattack targeting refrigeration systems hits 700 supermarkets. https://www.clickondetroit.com/business/2026/10/13/cyberattack-targeting-refrigeration-systems-hits-700-supermarkets-french-government-says/

  4. OCCRP (2026, Oct). Hackers Turn French Supermarket Refrigerators Into Furnaces. https://www.occrp.org/en/news/hackers-turn-french-supermarket-refrigerators-into-furnaces

  5. The Local France (2026, Oct 13). What we know so far about the cyberattack. https://www.thelocal.fr/20261013/what-we-know-so-far-about-the-cyberattack-that-targeted-french-supermarkets

  6. The Register (2026, Oct). Danfoss: affected French supermarkets ran outdated firmware. https://www.theregister.com/a/5302784

  7. Security Affairs (2026, Oct 13). Hackers cranked French supermarkets’ freezers up to 50 degrees. https://securityaffairs.com/200863/ha

  8. BetaNews (2026, Oct). Attack on French supermarket fridges hit outdated Danfoss controllers. https://betanews.com/article/danfoss-fridge-attack-france-supermarket/

  9. Gulf News (2026, Oct). Hackers raise supermarket fridge temperatures to 50°C. https://gulfnews.com/world/europe/hackers-raise-supermarket-fridge-temperatures-to-50c-in-massive-cyberattack-1.500708617

  10. SBS News / Reuters (2026, Oct). Hackers hit French supermarket fridges, sparking fires. https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/hackers-hit-french-store-fridges-sparks-fires/4y35b0buh

  11. Illawarra Mercury / AAP (2026, Oct). Cyberattack hits French store fridges, sparks fires. https://www.illawarramercury.com.au/story/9367218/cyberattack-hits-french-store-fridges-sparks-fires/

  12. KIRO 7 / CNN (2026, Oct). Hackers target freezers and cold storage. https://www.kiro7.com/news/trending/hackers-target-freezers-cold-storage-cyberattacks/O56CGOCVNREEVKXKVX7OZCJYRU/

  13. Khaleej Times / AFP (2026, Oct 12). French supermarkets suffer refrigerator shutdown. https://www.khaleejtimes.com/europe/french-supermarkets-refrigerator-shutdown-cyberattack

  14. Blue News / DPA (2026, Oct 12). Cyberattack Paralyzes Refrigeration Systems at French Retail Chains. https://www.bluewin.ch/en/news/cyberattack-paralyzes-refrigeration-systems-at-french-retail-chains-li.3633291

  15. T2 Online (2026, Oct). Hackers heat supermarket freezers across France. https://t2online.in/tech/tech-news/hackers-heat-supermarket-freezers-across-france--spoiling-food-and-sparking-fires/2008723

  16. Journal du Geek (2026, Oct 12). Super U, Leclerc et Intermarché victimes d’une cyberattaque massive. https://www.journaldugeek.com/2026/10/12/super-u-leclerc-et-intermarche-victime-dune-cyberattaque-massive-deja-270-000-euros-de-pertes/

  17. Business Today (2026, Oct 18). Can hackers take control of your smart fridge? https://www.businesstoday.in/technology/news/story/can-hackers-take-control-of-your-smart-fridge-france-attack-highlights-risks-of-connected-devices-562175-2026-10-18

  18. ActuIA (2026, Oct). Claroty reproduit avec l’IA l’exploit de failles connues en 28 minutes. https://www.actuia.com/actualite/danfoss-claroty-reproduit-avec-lia-lexploit-de-failles-connues-en-28-minutes-pour-environ-6-dollars/

  19. iTWire (2026). Claroty finds vulnerabilities in Danfoss and Copeland refrigeration controllers. https://itwire.com/guest-articles/guest-research/chilling-discoveries-claroty-finds-multiple-security-vulnerabilities-in-danfoss-and-copeland-refrigeration-controllers.html

  20. Refindustry (2026). Danfoss, Copeland and Trane address controller security vulnerabilities. https://refindustry.com/news/danfoss-copeland-and-trane-address-controller-security-vulnerabilities/

Wave two: Europe and Romania

  1. The Hacker News (2026, Nov 3). New Wave of Refrigeration Cyberattacks Hits Supermarkets Across Europe. https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/second-wave-of-cyberattacks-hits.html

  2. Euronews (2026, Nov 3). Which countries in Europe have been hit by supermarket fridge cyber incidents? https://www.euronews.com/2026/11/03/which-countries-in-europe-have-been-hit-by-supermarket-fridge-cyber-incidents

  3. Help Net Security (2026, Nov 2). Second wave of refrigeration cyberattacks hits European supermarkets. https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/02/european-supermarkets-refrigeration-units-cyberattacks/

  4. Observatorul Prahovean (2026, Nov 3). Atac cibernetic asupra frigiderelor din supermarketuri în România. https://www.observatorulph.ro/national/2802674-atac-cibernetic-asupra-frigiderelor-din-supermarketuri-in-romania-s-au-incalzit-peste-noapte

  5. Cotidianul (2026, Nov). Lanț de supermarketuri din România vizat de posibile atacuri ale hackerilor. https://www.cotidianul.ro/lant-de-supermarketuri-din-romania-vizat-de-posibile-atacuri-ale-hackerilor-temperatura-din-frigiderele-a-6-unitati-modificata/

  6. HotNews.ro (2026, Nov). Frigiderele din 6 magazine din România, posibil vizate în noul atac. https://hotnews.ro/frigiderele-din-6-magazine-din-romania-ale-aceluiasi-lant-de-supermarketuri-posibil-vizate-in-noul-atac-care-a-ridicat-temperaturile-la-50-de-grade-2393059

  7. Monitorul de Galați (2026, Nov). Atac cibernetic asupra unui lanț de supermarketuri din România. https://www.monitoruldegalati.ro/national/atac-cibernetic-asupra-unui-lant-de-supermarketuri-din-romania-sase-magazine-au-ramas-cu-instalatiile-frigorifice-la-temperaturi-ridicate.html