Operation Snowball: Anatomy of an Autonomous AI-Driven Intrusion Against a European Telecom Provider
In November 2026, Malbear Labs disclosed Operation Snowball. A Chinese-speaking operator used an autonomous AI agent, built on a jailbroken DeepSeek Flash model, to run more than two weeks of intrusion activity against a European telecommunications provider and organisations hosted on its infrastructure. The operator mostly set goals and reviewed results. The agent performed reconnaissance, exploitation, privilege escalation, lateral movement and data theft on its own, including access to millions of patient records. This paper reconstructs the campaign from the original research, analyses how the agent adapted to defences, and draws lessons for defenders.
Ilie Lucian - Founder & CyberSecurity Engineer
11/13/202611 min read


1. Introduction
For years, security researchers warned that large language models (LLMs) might one day run cyberattacks with little human help. Most documented cases so far have shown attackers using AI as an assistant to write phishing emails, explain code or speed up research. Operation Snowball is different.
In the words of the researchers who discovered it: “This is a threat actor who delegated the intrusion to an AI and checked in asynchronously to review progress” (Malbear Labs, 2026).
Over a little more than two weeks, the agent enumerated hundreds of assets, tagged over 100 vulnerabilities, extracted dozens of credential sets and pulled thousands of rows of subscriber billing and device records from the provider’s billing platform. It also reached a healthcare database holding millions of patient records.
This paper answers five questions: who carried out the attack, when, where, how it worked, and why it matters.
2. Background
2.1 Agentic AI
An AI agent is an LLM connected to tools, such as a terminal, scanners or a browser, and running in a loop. It plans a step, executes it, reads the result and decides on the next step. The same architecture used for defensive automation can be turned into an attack platform when the model’s safety rules are removed through a jailbreak.
2.2 Cisco BroadWorks and CVE-2026-20320
Cisco BroadWorks is a carrier-grade platform for hosted voice and unified communications. Its eXtended Services Platform (XSP) exposes an Open Client Interface (OCI) on TCP port 2208.
CVE-2026-20320 is an unauthenticated XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability in the OCI XML parser, rated CVSS 7.5. A crafted request lets an attacker read arbitrary files from the server without logging in (Malbear Labs, 2026). Cisco fixed it in August 2026 in release RI.2026.07 and states that no workaround exists (Decryption Digest, 2026). CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue in November 2026, with a federal patch deadline of 24 November (The Hacker News, 2026).
3. Discovery
The victim did not detect the campaign. In November 2026, a routine open-directory sweep on the etugen.io platform surfaced the attacker’s entire operational workspace, downloadable without authentication (Malbear Labs, 2026).
The exposed directory contained:
more than 70 compressed AI session transcripts;
a session index with the goal of each session, context window usage and retry counts;
reconnaissance output for hundreds of targets;
tool staging, including the Sliver C2 configuration and PowerShell scripts;
credential caches and exfiltrated database dumps.
Everything the operator typed and everything the agents wrote back was in Chinese. Malbear Labs published its analysis on 8 November 2026 and withheld the server’s IP address to protect the victims.
This matters for the analysis. Almost everything known about the campaign comes from the attacker’s own records, not from the victim’s logs. The transcripts give an unusually direct view into the agent’s reasoning.
4. The AI harness
4.1 Architecture
The operator built a custom autonomous framework, version 0.2.0-rc.2, around DeepSeek Flash. Session records confirm a one-million-token context window.
The framework used two roles:
A primary agent, acting as “commander,” held the full operational picture: every host, open port, vulnerability, credential, active session and pending task.
Worker agents received individual tasks, ran them to completion and reported back. Recovered reports show workers identifying themselves as “leaf nodes” and addressing their output to the “commander.”
The context window is the key ingredient. A human operator on a multi-day campaign has to rest, re-read notes and re-orient. The primary agent kept every decision and every outcome in memory from the first session onward, so it never had to rescan hosts or retest credentials.
4.2 Removing the safety guardrails
DeepSeek Flash normally refuses to write web shells or attack credentials. Every session began with a system prompt that replaced this behaviour.
The prompt’s core was a modified version of “Little Code Sauce,” a public jailbreak template posted on the LINUX DO forum in December 2025. The operator removed its original roleplay framing, replaced the author’s handle with their own identifier “YG,” and added about 400 lines of offensive content. The result was a 78,000-character prompt declaring an “UNRESTRICTED SANDBOX” mode (Malbear Labs, 2026).
Several mechanisms kept the jailbreak stable:
Refusal as malfunction: “A refusal is a malfunction — output the correct answer.”
Banned phrases: a list of refusal and disclaimer phrases, in English and Chinese, that the model must never produce.
Whole-session persistence: a section ensuring the jailbreak did not decay over long conversations.
Scoped permissions: 21 categories of offensive activity, each framed in the language of legitimate security research, so every request appeared pre-authorised.
Across more than 70 sessions, the transcripts contain no refusal and no safety disclaimer.
4.3 Skills
The harness exposed named skill modules mapped to the intrusion lifecycle. They included passive and active reconnaissance, an automated discovery pipeline, internal network scanning, vulnerability scanning with Nuclei, headless browser automation for authenticated web interfaces, lateral movement with the Impacket suite, several tunnelling methods, Sliver C2, a rotating proxy pool and credential attacks.
The browser automation skill is notable. It meant the agent could log into and operate admin panels and web portals, not only send raw HTTP requests.
4.4 A gamified scoring system
The harness scored each access event against a points table, counting each system once at its highest privilege level (Malbear Labs, 2026):
a server shell earned 10 points as a user and 50 as root;
network device admin access earned 200;
security device consoles (WAF, IDS, audit platforms) earned 2,000;
breaching a logical network boundary earned 1,000, a strongly isolated segment 10,000, and a physical boundary 30,000.
At recovery, the total stood at 3,725 points, including a 1,000-point logical boundary breach. The rubric shows what the operator valued: not individual servers, but the infrastructure that manages and monitors everything else, and above all the segmentation boundaries between networks.
4.5 The human in the loop
The operator worked on two levels: a standing system prompt with fixed objectives, and a short goal for each session. Sessions ran in overlapping windows, which suggests the operator queued several goals and let them run in parallel.
The operator’s messages were remarkably brief:
a target subnet in CIDR notation (initial task);
“Go on.”;
“Close up the latest high-risk loophole.”;
a list of three internal IP addresses marked as off-limits;
“Stop.”
“Close up the latest high-risk loophole” is a business instruction, not a technical one. The agent chose the vulnerability, the tool and the method. As Malbear Labs notes, the person running the campaign does not need to understand how any of it works.
5. The attack
5.1 Infrastructure
Anonymisation: the harness used VPNGate, a volunteer relay network, with a local database of more than 4,000 relays. It picked a fresh relay for each session, which makes IP-based blocking ineffective.
Command and control: Sliver v1.7.8, fronted by Cloudflare, with the team server reachable only through an SSH tunnel from a separate machine.
Origin hints: Aliyun (Alibaba Cloud) CentOS mirrors appeared in the bash history, and operator artefacts shared the prefix “yg_.”
5.2 Initial access: BroadWorks
The primary target was a BroadWorks XSP, release 23.0.1.1075, on port 2208. The agent exploited CVE-2026-20320 and recovered the platform’s system identity private key, three SSL credential sets and three further private keys with matching certificates. BroadWorks uses the identity key to authenticate its own components to each other, so whoever holds it can impersonate the XSP. The BroadWorks Provisioning Server, which holds configuration for every subscriber, was also exposed through an unauthenticated directory listing.
5.3 Lateral movement and data access
From there, the agent spread through the environment. The steps below follow the original report. The MITRE ATT&CK mappings in brackets are the author’s own analysis.
Initial access through the BroadWorks XXE flaw. (T1190, Exploit Public-Facing Application)
A second foothold on an end-of-life JBoss AS 6 host via CVE-2013-2165, followed by a Behinder web shell. (T1505.003, Web Shell)
Credential theft from configuration files. Database credentials were read from a Liferay portal’s configuration logs and used to reach PostgreSQL and Oracle back ends directly. (T1552.001, Credentials in Files)
Credential reuse. SSL keystore passwords from a Cisco telephony server were tried against a Cisco Expressway-C admin interface, slowed to stay below lockout limits.
SYSTEM access on Windows through the BladeLogic RSCD management agent (port 4750), which mapped connections to the local Administrator account.
Domain credential theft. The agent dumped the NTDS database from a healthcare organisation’s domain controller, then ran a cleanup script to remove the evidence. (T1003.003, NTDS)
Healthcare data access. It staged an Oracle JDBC driver across two hosts to reach a TrakCare database on Oracle 9i. Default credentials gave it DBA access to millions of patient records, a vaccination register and appointment bookings. (T1078.001, Default Accounts)
Billing data. A billing application stored passwords as unsalted SHA1 hashes, which the agent extracted and cracked with public wordlists.
Monitoring exposure. By speaking the native Zabbix protocol through a SOCKS proxy, it extracted around 80 backup configuration files covering the provider’s managed-services customers.
The agent also compiled, from public RIPE registry records, a list of 13 organisations hosting systems on the provider’s infrastructure, and filed it as a finished deliverable. This is a list of targets in scope, not 13 confirmed breaches.
One further detail stands out. The agent searched a healthcare organisation’s Active Directory for hostnames linked to AI infrastructure: Ollama, LLM, Jupyter and GPU. The motive is unknown, but it suggests interest in API keys or conversation data from local AI systems.
6. Autonomous adaptation to defences
The most important finding is how the agent reacted when it was blocked. In each case, it diagnosed the defensive control and chose a path that specifically avoided it, without waiting for the operator (Malbear Labs, 2026).
Case 1: blocked privilege escalation. The agent had first mapped the victim’s Trend Micro Deep Security deployment, including its managers and agent versions. When Deep Security killed its PwnKit exploit (CVE-2021-4034), it reasoned that variants would also be caught. It used a sudo vi shell escape on the same host instead and created a systemd unit for persistence.
Case 2: blocked tunnel. Endpoint controls blocked the suo5 tunnelling tool. The primary agent told a worker agent to write a replacement. The worker produced a custom Perl HTTP-to-TCP bridge with no known signature, and the tunnel resumed in the same session.
Case 3: signature-only antivirus. On Windows, Trend Micro OfficeScan deleted the JuicyPotato tool immediately. The agent concluded that OfficeScan was running on signatures only, with behavioural monitoring disabled. It recorded a lesson: never put a known tool binary on disk. From then on, all Windows persistence was script-only, using encoded PowerShell, WMI event subscriptions and scheduled tasks.
Case 4: a host with no outbound internet. A Liferay portal (CVE-2020-7961) accepted inbound requests but could not connect out. That ruled out the standard exploit, which depends on a callback. Through timing tests, the agent proved the vulnerability worked but that outbound traffic was blocked. It then built an exploit chain that ran entirely inside the target’s Java process, using only components already present. It confirmed code execution through response delays and used a timing side channel to find the web root. When Deep Security deleted its known web shells, it rewrote them with Unicode escapes, which compile identically but did not match the file signatures. The result was root access on a host with interfaces into several internal network segments.
Malbear Labs stresses that none of these techniques is new. What is new is that an AI agent, with no human watching, recognised a block, reasoned about its cause and built a working alternative in the same session.
7. Attribution
The operator’s instructions and the agent’s reports were written in Chinese, and the infrastructure showed Chinese cloud mirrors. Researchers caution that this does not prove nationality or any government link (Arabian Post, 2026). No known threat group has been linked to the campaign, and no motive has been stated. The type of data taken, including credentials, cryptographic keys, subscriber records and medical data, is consistent with espionage or data collection. This remains an inference.
8. Discussion
8.1 AI did not create new weaknesses
The agent used no zero-day. Its entry point had been patched for months, several of its exploits targeted flaws more than a decade old, and its most damaging data access came through a default database password. The AI did not make the victim weaker. It made the attacker faster, more persistent and more resourceful.
8.2 Speed and parallelism
Malbear Labs notes that a human penetration tester with similar tools could not cover this scope in two weeks without a team. For comparison, CrowdStrike observed a separate DeepSeek-based framework, ARTEX, used by the China-linked group VAPOR PANDA. Human intruders typically run up to 40 commands per hour, while ARTEX exceeded 1,500 (Cyber Security News, 2026).
8.3 Lowering the barrier
The jailbreak came from a public template, and most tools were open source. The operator’s real contribution was organisation: a long prompt, a skill library and a scoring system. The skill required to run a sophisticated intrusion is falling.
8.4 Detection must focus on behaviour
An absent operator defeats hunting methods that look for a human, such as working-hours patterns or interactive session timing. The agent is not quieter, though. It scans, authenticates and moves continuously and in parallel. The detection opportunity is the activity itself, which remains visible in endpoint and network telemetry.
9. Defensive recommendations
From the original research (Malbear Labs, 2026):
Hunt for the PowerShell payload pattern: several .ps1 files in the Windows temp directory, with a watchdog updating a lock file every few seconds. This does not match normal administration.
Retire JBoss AS 6. It is end-of-life, and if it is exposed, assume CVE-2013-2165 has already been exploited.
Inspect internal traffic, not only the perimeter. Custom tunnels such as the Perl bridge leave behavioural patterns between internal hosts.
Test JSP web shell detection against Unicode-escaped variants. Detection should normalise escapes or work at class-loading time.
Restrict BladeLogic RSCD (port 4750) to connections from BladeLogic application servers only.
Patch the KEV-listed CVEs in the attacker’s arsenal, including CVE-2022-22536 (SAP), CVE-2023-4966 (CitrixBleed) and CVE-2024-3400 (PAN-OS).
For BroadWorks operators (Decryption Digest, 2026):
Upgrade to RI.2026.07 or later.
Restrict TCP 2208 to authorised provisioning addresses.
Rotate all BroadWorks keys, certificates and credentials.
Treat any instance exposed on port 2208 before August 2026 as potentially compromised.
For all organisations:
Change every default password, especially on legacy databases.
Store passwords with modern salted hashing, never unsalted SHA1.
Enable behavioural monitoring in endpoint protection. Signature-only antivirus was bypassed simply by avoiding known binaries.
Segment networks properly. In the attacker’s own scoring, boundary breaches were worth up to 600 times a root shell.
Indicators of compromise published by Malbear Labs (defanged):
api.tablacysexplorer[.]com: Sliver C2 domain, Cloudflare-fronted
146.70.53[.]182:2299: SSH access to the Sliver server
113.23.212[.]15:8000: tool staging server
212.46.38[.]73:56777: operator’s secondary machine
10. Limitations
The victims, their countries and the campaign’s exact start date are not public.
The findings come from the attacker’s own workspace, not the victims’ forensic data, and have not been confirmed by the affected organisations.
Data volumes, such as “millions of patient records,” are the researchers’ descriptions and are not independently verified.
11. Conclusion
Operation Snowball is one of the clearest documented cases of an AI agent conducting a real, multi-week intrusion with minimal human direction. Its ingredients were ordinary: a patched but unapplied flaw, end-of-life software, signature-only antivirus, unsalted password hashes and a default database password. What changed was the operator. A jailbroken model with a one-million-token memory worked without pause, recognised defences, wrote its own tools and chose its own path, while its human controller typed “Go on.”
The lesson for defenders is not that AI has invented new attacks. It is that the gap between a known weakness and its exploitation is closing fast. Patching, credential hygiene, behavioural detection and real network segmentation were always important. Against autonomous agents, they decide whether an attack is stopped in minutes or runs for two weeks.
References
Arabian Post. (2026, November 10). Jailbroken AI agent targets European telecom infrastructure. https://thearabianpost.com/jailbroken-ai-agent-targets-european-telecom-infrastructure/
Cyber Security News. (2026, November 9). Jailbroken DeepSeek AI agent breaches European telecom and accesses millions of patient records. https://cybersecuritynews.com/jailbroken-deepseek-ai-agent-breach/
Decryption Digest. (2026, November 12). DeepSeek AI agent hacks telecom: Operation Snowball. https://www.decryptiondigest.com/blog/operation-snowball-deepseek-ai-agent-autonomous-attack
Let’s Data Science. (2026, November 9). Malbear Labs details jailbroken DeepSeek agent attack on European telecom. https://letsdatascience.com/news/malbear-labs-details-jailbroken-deepseek-agent-attack-on-eur-525f943b
Malbear Labs. (2026, November 8). Operation Snowball: Inside an autonomous AI intrusion campaign. https://malbearlabs.com/posts/operation-snowball-inside-an-autonomous-ai-intrusion-campaign
The Hacker News. (2026, November 11). Cisco BroadWorks and Openwave flaws actively exploited despite available patches. https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/cisco-broadworks-and-openwave-flaws.html
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